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Abstract 
Despite (or perhaps reflecting) widespread awareness of its ambiguity, the term 
‘geoengineering’ has in recent years become massively more prominent. 
Academic, policy and civil society circles routinely use this term to describe, 
support or oppose a diverse range of techniques and ideas.  This study aims to 
contribute to understandings of ways in which variously envisaged approaches to 
‘geoengineering’ of the global climate are currently being framed. It asks not 
only about variously viewed implications of geoengineering itself, but also what 
these diverse framings can reveal about wider politics in contemporary debates 
around climate change, science and technology.  The paper applies Q 
methodology to analyse geoengineering as a subjective discursive construct, the 
bounds of which are continually negotiated and contested.  35 participants from 
a variety of disciplinary and institutional backgrounds in the UK, US, Canada and 
Japan undertook a ‘Q sort’ of 48 opinion statements about geoengineering 
between December 2012 and February 2013.  Four distinctive framings emerged 
from this analysis, labelled: ‘At the very least we need more research’; ‘We are 
the planetary maintenance engineers’; ‘Geoengineering is a political project’; 
and ‘Let’s focus on Carbon.’  Results indicate a strong polarity around 
divergently-construed pros and cons of geoengineering as a whole – 
underscoring the political salience of this term. But additional axes of difference 
suggest a more nuanced picture than straightforward pro/anti positioning.  The 
ambiguity of the term is argued to offer interpretive flexibility for articulating 
diverse interests within and across contending framings. The paper questions 
whether increasing terminological precision will necessarily facilitate greater 
clarity in governance discussions or public engagement, and argues that the 
merits of any given form of precision will depend on particular framings. Much 
ambiguity in this area may thus be irreducible, and hence the challenge lies 
rather in realising the wider implications of the political pluralities this reveals.  
 
Introduction 
This paper explores divergent societal framings of variously-envisaged 
approaches to ‘geoengineering’ of the global climate (henceforth 
geoengineering). A diverse array of technologies are commonly referred to as 
geoengineering, including those that have been collectively labelled as solar 
	   	  
radiation management methods (such as stratospheric aerosol injection and 
marine cloud brightening), and  those referred to as carbon dioxide removal 
methods (such as ocean iron fertilization, or direct air capture) (Shepherd et al. 
2009). Although the term geoengineering has become increasingly prominent in 
discussions of these approaches  in scientific, policy, and civil society circles, 
there is evidence of a growing sense that the label itself may be so broad and 
ambiguous as to be unhelpful, or even incoherent.  Thus the recent report from 
the IPCC ‘expert meeting on geoengineering’  draws attention to the ‘fuzzy’ 
boundary between geoengineering and other approaches to dealing with climate 
change, and suggests that ‘because of the longstanding ambiguity surrounding 
the term geoengineering … the individual methods discussed might be referred 
to more specifically’ (Edenhofer et al. 2012, p.3). This refrain about the need to 
look at different technologies and approaches separately runs through many 
other reports on geoengineering, and yet many of them (like the IPCC report) 
retain the word geoengineering in their titles (Shepherd et al. 2009; GAO 2010). 
In one such report by the US think tank, the Bipartisan Policy Centre (Long et al. 
2011), debates around whether the term geoengineering ‘was too 
imprecise…[or] too controversial’ (Sarewitz 2011, p.7), actually resulted in the 
appearance of the additional (equally imprecise) term ‘climate remediation’ 
being used alongside geoengineering in the title. Given the widespread 
awareness of the ambiguity of the term, and the difficulties this poses for 
meaningful governance, is it the case that the term geoengineering can be said 
to have simply outgrown its usefulness?  Or is it that, as has been argued to be 
the case for terms such as ‘sustainability’ or ‘sustainable development’ (Baker et 
al. 1997) it is the very ambiguity of the terms that might make them particularly 
useful to certain actors and give them a resilience they might not otherwise have 
had?  
In this study rather than seeing ambiguity as ‘a linguistic veil which can be lifted 
to reveal the truth’ (Rydin 1999, p.468), and attempting to remove it by 
carrying out our own boundary work to define a sub-set of technologies or 
approaches as our object of study, we embrace the ambiguity of the term 
geoengineering.   This study is thus distinct from previous work on frames and 
framing of geoengineering, much of which starts by offering a definition of 
geoengineering as the object of study (Sikka 2012; Luokkanen, Huttunen & 
Hildén 2013; Huttunen & Mikael Hilden 2012; Scholte et al. 2013; Nerlich & 
Jaspal 2012).1 This paper takes a fundamentally different approach: rather than 
treating geoengineering as an object, a ‘novel controversial technology’ 
(Luokkanen, Huttunen & Hildén 2013), or even a set of technologies about which 
there exists an array of sometimes conflicting opinions, or for which there is 
support or opposition, this study treats geoengineering as a discursive 
phenomenon, the bounds of which are continually being negotiated.  This is in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1	  An	  exception	  might	  be	  the	  work	  of	  Bellamy	  et	  al.(Bellamy	  et	  al.	  2012)	  who	  do	  explicitly	  explore	  the	  ambiguity	  
in	  the	  term	  at	  the	  outset	  of	  their	  paper,	  however	  there	  is	  a	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  attempt	  to	  minimise	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  ambiguity	  by	  
adopting	  a	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line with insights from post-positivist policy analysts such as Hajer who have 
drawn attention to the fact that environmental conflict should not be understood 
as ‘a conflict over a pre-defined unequivocal problem with competing actors pro 
and con,’ but rather should be seen as ‘a complex and continuous struggle over 
the definition and meaning of the environmental problem itself’ (M. A. Hajer 
1997, p.14). Focusing analytical attention on the inherently ambiguous, 
undifferentiated category  ‘geoengineering’ (a term that has been referred to as 
a ‘quasi-stable meta-label’ (Porter & Hulme 2013, p.3)), is argued to be the best 
way to identify (rather than impose) the most significant axes for distinction, as 
these relate to key differences in divergent perspectives.   
Rather than working to remove ambiguity from the term geoengineering then, 
this study shifts the focus to an exploration of the kinds of work it does (in spite 
of, or because of the ambiguities within it), the boundary work it prompts and 
the tensions and ambivalences it inspires and reveals.  We ask what these can 
reveal about the kinds of politics at work in contemporary debates around 
climate change, science and technology.  
Framing geoengineering 
There is a small but growing body of social scientific literature examining 
discourses and framing of geoengineering, including work examining framings of 
geoengineering in the media (Porter & Hulme 2013; Scholte et al. 2013; 
Luokkanen, Huttunen, Hildén, et al. 2013), academic literature (Bellamy et al. 
2012; Huttunen & Mikael Hilden 2012), work examining the use of metaphor in 
framings of geoengineering (Nerlich & Jaspal 2012), or examining the framings 
within particular influential texts (Gardiner 2011).  While a number of common 
themes (for example the importance of ‘climate emergency’ as a framing device) 
emerge from this work, a diversity of findings have been presented regarding 
the relative openness or otherwise of the discourse around geoengineering, or 
the relative importance of strategic framing to the issue.  Given that the term is 
arguably still unfamiliar to many people, some have argued that the ‘first 
impression, frame, and narrative has yet to be set’ (Leiserowitz 2010, cited by 
Buck 2013), or suggested that there is a need for more active and strategic 
framing of the issue by scientists in particular ways (Buck 2013).  On the other 
hand others have suggested that the way that appraisals of geoengineering 
options have been carried out to date, provide evidence of a premature ‘closing 
down’ around particular ‘sets of values and assumptions with respect to the 
instrumental framing effects of contexts, methods and criteria and options’ 
(Bellamy et al. 2012, p.28), or cite evidence from analysis of the metaphors 
used to describe geoengineering as indicative of ‘restrictions in the interpretative 
flexibility’ of the term (Luokkanen, Huttunen & Hildén 2013).  Sikka takes a 
particularly strong view of the strategic nature of the framing of geoengineering 
to date, arguing that ‘special interests, including private corporations, 
conservative think tanks and scientists affiliated with both have drawn on a 
variety of discursive frames to limit, shape and mould the current debate 
	   	  
surrounding geoengineering’ (Sikka 2012, p.173). Conversely others have drawn 
evidence from an analysis of the changing frames of geoengineering apparent in 
English speaking newspapers in recent years, to argue that there is evidence of 
a progressive ‘opening up’ of the debate around geoengineering  (Scholte et al. 
2013).   
This study falls broadly under the description of a frame-reflective analysis 
outlined by Schon and Rein (Schön & Rein 1995), and complements and builds 
upon the corpus of work on framing of geoengineering by bringing a distinctive 
focus on the ambiguity of the term, as outlined above.  Within this study, frames 
are understood as ‘schemata of interpretation’ (Goffman 1974, p.21), or 
narratives of understanding that ‘help to render events meaningful and thereby 
function to organize experience and guide action’ (Benford & Snow 2000, p.614). 
Crucially, frames have both ontological and normative dimensions in that they 
‘link causal accounts of policy problems to particular proposals for action, and so 
link accounts of ‘is’ and ‘ought’ (Rein and Schon cited in Fischer and Forester 
1993, p. 11). Hoppe (1999) emphasises that frames are necessary for 
judgement and action, acting as ‘a sort of mental grappling hook’ (p.207) to 
enable people to make sense of and act on a given situation.  Through 
selectively emphasizing certain facets of a given issue over others, and linking 
interpretation with action, frames in and of themselves can be understood to 
perform particular functions (c.f. Entman 2004).  However there may be a 
distinction made between the use of the verb framing and the resulting frames 
or framings as nouns, with the former denoting ‘an active processual 
phenomenon that implies agency and contention at the level of reality 
construction’(Benford & Snow 2000, p.614).  Although not exclusively a 
conscious phenomenon, a rich literature from the study of social movements has 
highlighted the ways in which framing can be used as a tool to affect change.  In 
this sense, framing can be understood as ‘the conscious strategic efforts by 
groups of people to fashion shared understandings of the world and of 
themselves that legitimate and motivate collective action’ (Snow, in McAdam, 
McCarthy and Zald, 1996:6 Emphasis added).    
Although there are several different quantitative and qualitative methods 
applicable to framing analysis, this study uses Q method (see Box 1), to create a 
typology of frames in a systematic way so as to render these shared subjective 
constructions of the world observable (c.f. Dayton 2000). While various framing 
analyses have explored discursive elements in isolation (e.g. metaphors), in its 
application of Q method, this work aims to use an operant approach to allow 
participants autonomy to bring these framing elements together to constitute 
frames.  
 
Data collection 
	   	  
The ‘Q sort’ is the basic unit of data in a Q study, and consists of a selection of 
subjective statements about the topic of interest, rank-ordered by a participant 
according to a particular instruction (for example according to those that are 
most-to-least like the participant’s point of view).  To select the statements that 
are to be sorted, the researcher first gathers as comprehensive as possible a 
selection of statements to reflect the diversity of opinions about the subject. This 
selection of statements is known as the ‘concourse’, and represents an attempt 
to capture the ‘volume of discussion’ on a given topic (Brown 1986, p.58).  In 
this case, subjective statements about the topic of geoengineering were sought 
from a diverse range of sources, including academic papers, government policy 
documents, NGO reports, scientific and popular news media sources, television 
and radio interviews, blog posts and comments on online news sites.  It is 
common practice within Q studies to include some statements that are 
‘deliberately ambiguous’ (Dryzek & Berejikian 1993) or contain ‘excess meaning’ 
(Brown 1970).  Because the statements do not just have one objective meaning 
set by the researcher, but are intended to act as stimuli to reveal the internal 
frames of reference of the participants, this ambiguity is not problematic as it 
would be in, for example a questionnaire design.   
 
Box 1. Q method overview 
 
Q is a ‘quali-quantitative’ method that can be used to examine the subjectivity inherent 
in any given topic around which there is social contestation, and as such, lends itself 
particularly well to the study of frames (c.f. Dayton 2000).  Q  has disciplinary roots in 
psychology (Stephenson 1935), but is now commonly applied across a range of 
disciplines including political sciences  (Brown 1980; Dryzek & Berejikian 1993), 
geography (Eden et al. 2005); ecological economics (Swedeen 2006) and environmental 
policy analysis (Webler et al. 2009; Addams & Proops 2000).  Q is an intensive ‘small n’ 
method in which a number of purposively selected participants (usually between 20 – 
50) are asked to rank order a number of statements about a given topic.  Outcomes are 
then statistically analysed using factor analysis to look for patterns in ways of thinking 
and talking about the topic (i.e. frames).  Interview data and comments from the 
participants are used to aid interpretation of these patterns, and potentially to gain an 
insight into the more or less active processes of framing that different actors undertake.  
Although it has quantitative features, the method has a large qualitative component, and 
as with any other methodology, must be ‘employed reflexively and creatively, with full 
awareness of its interpretative dimensions and not as a number-crunching exercise’ 
(Eden, Donaldson, & Walker, 2005, p. 421).  Q methodology does not impose categories 
of discourse onto the data, a priori, or position participants with respect to some pre-
defined framework. Rather it asks its participants to decide what is or is not meaningful 
and relevant to their opinion by the process of sorting of statements.  It has been argued 
that the method’s potential to reveal discourses that might otherwise be obscured, might 
facilitate processes of ‘opening up’ policy to reflexive appraisal (Stirling 2007; Ockwell 
2008), and proponents of the method have claimed that by allowing the researcher to 
‘surrender the monopoly of control in their relationship with the researched’ Q method 
	   	  
can contribute to a more democratic research design and implementation (Robbins & 
Krueger 2000, p.636). 
 
The concourse in this study consisted of 322 statements, after which point the 
research team decided that the addition of further statements did not add to the 
diversity of opinions present, and that ‘saturation point’ (Eden et al. 2005) had 
been reached.  To narrow down the concourse to the sample of statements to be 
presented to participants, a structured approach was adopted whereby 
statements were categorised into a number of themes that were observed in the 
concourse as a whole.  These were: 1) context (the nature of ‘the problem’); 2) 
definitions and characteristics of geoengineering; 3) appraisals of 
geoengineering; 4) the relationship between science/research and deployment; 
and 5) governance concerns.  Approximately equal numbers of statements from 
each category were sought, with the aim that each would capture a particular 
dimension of the issue around which opinion might be divided.   The choice of 
the number of statements to be included in the final Q sample must balance the 
need to incorporate as great a diversity of statements as possible, against the 
need not to overly tax the abilities and patience of the participants.  In line with 
a rule of thumb that suggests a Q sample size of between 20 – 60 statements 
(Webler et al. 2009, p.15), the final sample consisted of 48 statements.  A pilot 
was carried out with 7 project members and colleagues in order to test the 
clarity of the statements, the comprehensiveness of the themes and topics 
covered by the statement sample, and the ease with which it was possible to 
sort them.  Following the pilot a number of statements were removed because 
they were felt to be confusing or to duplicate existing themes in the sample, 
others were paraphrased for greater clarity, and a number of additional 
statements were added to cover themes that were felt by pilot participants to be 
missing.  The final set of 48 statements is listed in Table 1. 
Participants and the Q sort 
The aim of this study was to uncover the different framings of the term 
geoengineering, hence the approach to participant selection was to focus on 
people who are or have been involved in debates and discussions around 
geoengineering, or those (self- selected) who would consider themselves to 
‘have an opinion’ on geoengineering.  The aim was not to try to elicit the views 
of some imagined wider ‘public’ as such, and no claim can be made that the 
sample group was in any sense representative of a larger population, but this is 
not the aim of a Q study (See Box 2). Rather, participants were selected on the 
basis that it was felt that they had the potential to reveal something interesting 
about the way in which debates around geoengineering are structured and the 
existing frames and framing strategies that are being employed.  Based on an 
initial review of the academic and non-academic literature on the topic, a list of 
participants was drawn up to encompass a range of people involved in making 
	   	  
statements about geoengineering, and attempts were made to incorporate as 
diverse as possible a group of people (from different disciplinary backgrounds, 
sectors, nationalities and genders).  This was complemented by a snowballing 
approach whereby participants were asked to identify other possible recruits 
with opinions that might differ from their own.  Additionally an invitation to 
participate was circulated to the geoengineering Google list (an online forum for 
discussion on geoengineering 2), Geoengineering Net Forum (a Japanese 
discussion forum3) and the African Technology Policy Studies Network4.  Given 
that the interest of the study was in revealing framings, rather than making any 
attempt to test the validity of viewpoints, the sole criterion for participation for 
those people responding to the general invitation was that participants 
considered themselves to ‘have an opinion’ about geoengineering. This criterion 
was applied based on the rationale that in order to have formulated an opinion 
on geoengineering an individual would need to have engaged with debates and 
discussions around the topic in some way, and their opinion would thus be as 
representative as anyone else’s of the types of framings of the issue that are 
emerging.   
 
Box 2. The notion of ‘sample size’ and generalizability of findings 
in a Q study 
 
Within traditional quantitative (‘R’) methods, the term ‘sample size’ refers to the number 
of participants, and is ideally as large as possible in order to be statistically 
representative of the larger population from which participants have been sampled, and 
thus to make it possible for inferences to be made about that population on the basis of 
the results of measurements of the sample.  In Q methodology, the concept of sample 
size is more applicable to the concourse of statements, and the notion of representation 
is relevant in as far as the statements in the concourse should be representative of the 
total range of statements being made about the topic.   Thus participants for a Q study 
are not randomly sampled from a population, but are deliberately chosen for their 
relevance to the topic in question (Brown 1980).  The most important principle of 
participant selection is diversity of opinion, so that ideally if a particular discourse exists, 
even if is very marginal, the process would hope to reveal it.  It is also important that 
the participants are familiar with the topic and have ‘well-formed opinions’ (Webler et 
al., 2009 p. 9 ).   
 
Given that the aim of a Q study is to search for distinct subjective viewpoints or framings 
of a given issue, and no claim is made about the proportions of the views uncovered in a 
wider population, the same need for large sample sizes does not apply in a Q study.  
Rather as Dryzek & Berejikian point out ‘our units of analysis, when it comes to 
generalization, are not individuals but discourses’ (Dryzek & Berejikian 1993). Thus 
although no claim can be made that the subjects who carried out the Q test are 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2	  https://groups.google.com/forum/?fromgroups#!forum/geoengineering	  
3	  http://geoeng.brs.nihon-­‐u.ac.jp/	  
4	  http://www.atpsnet.org/	  
	   	  
statistically representative of some larger population this is not the aim of a Q study.  
Instead in so far as the concourse is ‘representative’ of the breadth of opinion on the 
topic each factor described should ‘prove a genuine representation of that discourse as it 
exists within a larger population’ (Dryzek and Berejikian, 1993 p. 52).  And thus 
although it cannot be asserted that the factors uncovered by this study are the only 
viewpoints that exist on the topic, the discovery of factors other than those described 
(for example through the participation of an additional individual with a unique point of 
view) should  ‘in no way influence description’ of the existing factors (Brown, 1980 p. 
67). 
 
Furthermore, within a Q study, individual cases are not treated as anomalies, or 
insignificant, but can provide valuable insights to the topic in question. As Brown 
explains, given that ’the interest of Q methodology is in the nature of the segments 
[discourses] and the extent to which they are similar or dissimilar, the issue of large 
numbers, so fundamental to most social research, is rendered relatively unimportant.  In 
principle as well as practice, single cases can be the focus of significant research’ 
(Brown, 1993 p. 93). 
 
Participants were asked to sort the statements into a grid along a scale from +4 
(most like their point of view) to -4 (least like their point of view). As is common 
in Q studies, the grid had a pyramidal or ‘quasi-normal’ shape, which limited the 
number of statements that could be placed in each category (See Figure 1).  
Although the imposition of this distribution shape is not necessary for the 
technique to work (Brown 1971; Burt 1972; Barry & Proops 1999), it is 
considered good practice as it encourages the participants to consider the 
relative placement of the statements more carefully and hence to reveal their 
preferences more thoroughly (Webler et al. 2009).  In the majority of cases 
participants carried out a Q sort during a face-to-face interview with the 
researcher, and (with participant consent) comments made at the time of the Q 
sort were recorded to aid interpretation. Interviews lasted between 25 minutes 
up to 1.5 hours, averaging approximately 1 hour.  
In addition, to maximise the diversity of the participant group and facilitate 
participation from international participants, there was an option for participants 
to take part via an online interface using Q-Assessor (http://q-assessor.com ), a 
tool specifically designed for online Q studies.  The online study can be accessed 
(and carried out) by visiting http://q-assessor.com/studies/753/responses/new.  
The use of a combination of face-to-face Q sorts and online sorts has precedents 
in the literature on Q method (e.g. Gruber 2011) and is supported by empirical 
work which has shown there to be no apparent difference in the reliability or 
validity of face-to-face sorts and those carried out remotely by mail (Van 
Tubergen & Olins 1979); between paper sorts and online sorts in general (Hogan 
	   	  
2010); and between paper sorts and the specific online sorting program we 
applied in this study, Q-Assessor (Reber et al. 2000).5   
Thirty-five people, including 5 people involved with the Geoengineering 
Governance Project in various ways, carried out a Q sort.  The inclusion of 
researchers’ own Q sorts is considered good practice in scholarship on Q 
methodology (Robbins & Krueger 2000; Swedeen 2006).  Given that there is no 
such thing as a truly ‘frame neutral position’ (Schön & Rein 1995, p.38) from 
which to examine framings, in this study it was decided that to enhance both the 
reflexivity and transparency of the Climate Geoengineering Governance Project, 
it would be desirable both for the lead researcher and others less directly 
involved in this component of the project to reflect upon and reveal their own 
positionality within these debates. With participant permission, the list of 
participants and their institutional affiliations (where applicable) are listed in 
Appendix I.  Twenty-one individuals carried out face-to-face interviews, while 
thirteen people carried out the Q sort online6. Participants who carried out a 
web-based sort are distinguished in the results table by the letter (W), while 
individuals associated with the Climate Geoengineering Governance project, 
including the author, are distinguished by the letters CGG. 
 
 
 
    
 
 
 
    
 
 
   
 
    
 
   
 
    
 
   
 
    
 
   
 
    
 
   
 
    
 
   
 
    
 
   
 
    
-4 -3 -2 -1 0 +1 +2 +3 +4 
      Least like my point of view                         Most like my point of 
view 
Figure 1. The distribution shape onto which participants were asked to sort the 
statements in the Q sample. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
5	  Although	  more	  qualitative	  data	  can	  be	  collected	  from	  face-­‐to-­‐face	  interviews	  as	  compared	  to	  online	  sorts	  
(and	  hence	  a	  possible	  bias	  emerges	  in	  the	  fact	  that	  these	  sorts	  might	  be	  more	  fully	  interpreted	  than	  the	  online	  
sort	  patterns),	  the	  benefit	  to	  the	  overall	  study	  of	  being	  able	  to	  incorporate	  a	  greater	  diversity	  of	  participants	  
was	  felt	  to	  outweigh	  this	  concern.	  	  	  
6	  The	  author’s	  own	  Q	  sort	  brought	  the	  total	  number	  of	  sorts	  to	  35.	  
	   	  
 
Analysis 
The 35 sorts were analysed with the freely available software PQMethod 
(Schmolck 2002).   Each sort was correlated with every other sort, and a 35 by 
35 correlation matrix was generated. Principal components analysis was then 
used to identify clusters of similarly performed Q sorts, and the resulting factors 
were rotated using a varimax rotation that aimed to find the simplest structure 
in the data and to explain the greatest amount of variance.7  It is important to 
bear in mind that there is not just one objectively ‘correct’ or ‘mathematically 
superior’ solution regarding the number of factors that emerge from a Q study 
(Watts & Stenner 2005, p.80).  Rather, although the data itself is ‘fixed’ in the 
sense that the correlation scores between individual Q sorts do not change, 
there could be many vantage points from which to view and describe the 
similarities and differences between views, that are largely dependent on what 
one is interested in (for example, whether one is interested particularly in 
revealing minority views, or examining more dominant discourses). In this study 
a solution was sought that maximised the simplicity, clarity, distinctness and 
stability of the emerging framings (Webler et al. 2009, p.31), and ensured that 
at least 2 individual Q sorts correlated uniquely with each factor (cf. Brown, 
1980 p. 293). 
Based on these criteria, a three-factor solution was selected as optimal.  
However, scrutiny of the results revealed that one of the factors was ‘bipolar’: 
certain individuals’ sorts were highly positively correlated with this factor, while 
others were highly negatively correlated, indicating the presence of two groups 
of people who sorted the statements in more or less opposite ways.  In line with 
standard practice in Q studies (Brown 1980), the bipolar factor was split into two 
separate factors (highly negatively correlated with one another) resulting in a 
final solution consisting of the four factors that will be described below. 
Correlations between an individual’s Q sort and a given factor were deemed as 
being statistically significant at the p<0.01 level, if they exceeded a factor 
loading of  +/-0.38, based on the equation:  2.58 x (1/√n), where n = the 
number of statements in the Q sample: 2.58(1/ √48) = 0.3723 (Brown 1980). 
Sorts that were significantly correlated with a factor (i.e. those that load at +/- 
0.38 for that factor) were considered representative of that view, and the 
weighted average of those sorts were used to calculate an idealised sorting 
pattern for that factor along the original response scale (-4 to +4). These 
idealised sorting patterns are listed in Table 1.  The degree to which each 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7	  It	  is	  also	  possible	  to	  extract	  factors	  using	  the	  centroid	  method,	  and	  to	  rotate	  factors	  ‘by	  hand’	  in	  order	  to	  
explore	  the	  data	  based	  on	  particular	  theoretical	  hypotheses	  about	  how	  particular	  clusters	  relate	  or	  how	  
particular	  individual’s	  sorts	  fit	  into	  the	  overall	  picture,	  and	  some	  researchers	  argue	  that	  this	  is	  the	  preferable	  
approach	  (Brown,	  1980).	  	  In	  this	  instance	  both	  procedures	  were	  carried	  out	  and	  the	  results	  compared.	  	  While	  
not	  substantially	  different,	  principal	  components	  analysis	  and	  varimax	  produced	  the	  clearest	  and	  most	  stable	  
and	  interpretable	  result.	  
	   	  
participant’s sort correlated with each factor is described is given in Table 2.  
The degree of correlation between factors is given in Table 3.  Narrative 
descriptions of each factor were drafted by examining these idealised sorting 
patterns and analysing the interview comments made by those people’s whose 
sorts were significantly correlated with that factor.  Draft descriptions of these 
factor narratives were sent to all participants, who were asked to comment on 
whether they felt that their views had been appropriately represented.  These 
comments were used to test the validity of the views described. 
 
 
  
	   	  
Table of statements sorted by participants, and the idealised sorting 
pattern (from -4 to +4) for each factor 
Statement:	   Idealised	  sort	  pattern	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	  
1.	  Geoengineering	  is	  about	  fruitlessly	  trying	  to	  solve	  problems	  with	  the	  same	  mind-­‐
set	  that	  created	  them:	  attempting	  to	  control	  nature.	  
-­‐3	   -­‐4	   2	   -­‐3	  
2.	  Geoengineering	  can	  only	  ever	  be	  fundamentally	  undemocratic.	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	   1	   -­‐4	  
3.	  The	  risks	  of	  not	  doing	  geoengineering	  research	  outweigh	  the	  risks	  of	  doing	  it.	   3	   2	   -­‐2	   1	  
4.	  Hasty	  pursuit	  of	  international	  regulation	  of	  geoengineering	  risks	  lock-­‐in	  to	  
commitments	  that	  might	  soon	  be	  regretted,	  such	  as	  a	  total	  ban	  on	  research	  or	  
testing,	  or	  burdensome	  vetting	  of	  even	  innocuous	  research	  projects.	  
1	   3	   -­‐2	   0	  
5.	  Calls	  for	  more	  science	  on	  geoengineering	  don't	  really	  make	  sense:	  full	  trials	  are	  
unethical	  and	  small	  scale	  experiments	  are	  pointless	  (since	  any	  impacts	  are	  drowned	  
in	  the	  noise	  of	  global	  weather).	  
-­‐4	   -­‐3	   2	   -­‐3	  
6.	  We	  might	  once	  have	  trusted	  nature	  to	  look	  after	  the	  environmental	  regulation,	  
but	  not	  any	  more:	  like	  it	  or	  not,	  we	  are	  the	  planetary	  maintenance	  engineers.	  	  
1	   3	   -­‐2	   -­‐1	  
7.	  Deliberate	  geoengineering	  of	  the	  climate	  has	  been	  happening	  for	  decades;	  the	  
current	  suggestion	  that	  it’s	  all	  about	  dealing	  with	  climate	  change	  is	  just	  a	  front	  
intended	  to	  legitimize	  on	  going	  activities	  that	  have	  other	  motivations.	  	  
-­‐4	   -­‐2	   0	   -­‐1	  
8.	  One	  of	  the	  central	  motivations	  for	  the	  growing	  interest	  in	  geoengineering	  
research	  is	  the	  potential	  for	  strategic	  military	  applications	  of	  these	  technologies.	  	  	  
-­‐4	   -­‐2	   1	   1	  
9.	  The	  belief	  that	  technological	  solutions	  can	  be	  found	  to	  social	  problems,	  and	  to	  
problems	  arising	  in	  earlier	  technological	  development,	  is	  a	  dangerous	  illusion	  which	  
fails	  to	  address	  political	  and	  social	  drivers	  and	  implications.	  
-­‐1	   -­‐1	   3	   -­‐1	  
10.	  Geoengineering	  is	  a	  bit	  like	  chemotherapy:	  the	  decision	  to	  undertake	  it	  would	  
be	  difficult,	  but	  it	  could	  turn	  out	  to	  be	  the	  least	  bad	  option	  we	  are	  going	  to	  have.	  	  
2	   1	   -­‐3	   -­‐2	  
11.	  Carbon	  emissions	  will	  never	  be	  reduced	  to	  zero	  because	  this	  would	  require	  a	  
complete	  change	  in	  the	  way	  humans	  are.	  
0	   2	   0	   -­‐4	  
12.	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  we	  need	  to	  do	  more	  research	  in	  order	  to	  learn	  what	  
approaches	  to	  avoid	  even	  if	  we	  become	  desperate.	  
4	   2	   0	   3	  
13.	  It	  is	  inappropriate	  to	  make	  geoengineering	  research	  decisions	  subject	  to	  
'upstream	  engagement'	  or	  public	  control.	  
-­‐2	   0	   -­‐4	   -­‐2	  
14.	  Geoengineering	  is	  the	  most	  revolutionary	  and	  potentially	  valuable	  new	  idea	  in	  
climate	  policy	  today.	  
-­‐3	   2	   -­‐1	   -­‐3	  
15.	  Geoengineering	  is	  potentially	  the	  key	  to	  unlock	  the	  mitigation	  puzzle:	  a	  way	  of	  
controlling	  climate	  risks	  during	  the	  many	  decades	  that	  it	  will	  take	  to	  transform	  the	  
global	  energy	  system.	  
0	   1	   -­‐3	   1	  
16.	  The	  idea	  of	  actually	  deploying	  a	  geoengineering	  system	  would	  be	  very	  
controversial,	  but	  the	  narrower	  question	  of	  a	  research	  program	  should	  not	  be.	  
3	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	   -­‐1	  
17.	  The	  climate	  system	  is	  too	  complex	  and	  chaotic	  to	  judge	  cause	  and	  effect	  of	  
various	  geoengineering	  ideas,	  even	  as	  we	  try	  them	  out.	  
-­‐2	   -­‐2	   1	   4	  
18.	  After	  realizing	  that	  our	  actions	  en	  masse	  affect	  the	  climate,	  anything	  we	  do	  to	  
address	  it	  (including	  nothing),	  is	  geo-­‐engineering.	  
-­‐3	   1	   -­‐2	   3	  
19.	  The	  technical	  community	  has	  a	  responsibility	  to	  explore	  back-­‐up	  strategies	  for	  
dealing	  with	  an	  unexpected	  climate	  emergency.	  
1	   2	   -­‐1	   1	  
20.	  We	  use	  technology	  to	  clean	  up	  land	  and	  water,	  so	  why	  not	  clean	  up	  the	   1	   1	   0	   1	  
	   	  
contaminated	  sky?	  
21.	  Attempts	  by	  us	  to	  regulate	  the	  Earth's	  climate	  and	  chemistry	  would	  condemn	  
humanity	  to	  a	  Kafkaesque	  fate	  from	  which	  there	  may	  be	  no	  escape.	  
-­‐1	   -­‐4	   2	   -­‐2	  
22.	  The	  laudable	  goal	  of	  combating	  climate	  change	  has	  no	  business	  in	  the	  definition	  
of	  geoengineering,	  as	  it	  suggests	  that	  technologies	  do,	  in	  fact,	  combat	  climate	  
change	  giving	  the	  whole	  suite	  of	  planet-­‐altering	  technologies	  a	  veneer	  of	  
respectability	  they	  have	  not	  earned.	  	  	  
0	   -­‐1	   1	   -­‐1	  
23.	  Some	  geoengineering	  technologies	  might	  be	  able	  to	  provide	  win-­‐win	  solutions,	  
allowing	  economic	  growth	  and	  climate	  change	  mitigation	  to	  proceed	  hand	  in	  hand.	  
0	   2	   0	   2	  
24.	  More	  than	  a	  set	  of	  technologies,	  geoengineering	  is	  a	  political	  strategy.	   -­‐1	   0	   3	   2	  
25.	  Until	  there	  has	  been	  a	  full	  debate	  on	  the	  course	  all	  countries	  wish	  to	  go,	  it	  is	  
common	  sense	  to	  institute	  a	  moratorium	  on	  all	  geoengineering	  activities	  outside	  the	  
laboratory.	  	  
-­‐2	   -­‐4	   4	   2	  
26.	  Much	  current	  policy	  discussion	  of	  'geoengineering	  governance'	  makes	  no	  
reference	  to	  the	  possibility	  that	  the	  world	  could	  decide	  not	  to	  go	  down	  this	  path,	  
and	  is	  thus	  little	  more	  than	  a	  marketing	  exercise.	  
-­‐2	   -­‐1	   1	   0	  
27.	  Commercial	  involvement	  in	  geoengineering,	  including	  competition,	  may	  be	  
positive	  in	  that	  it	  mobilizes	  innovation	  and	  capital	  investment,	  which	  could	  lead	  to	  
the	  development	  of	  more	  effective	  and	  less	  costly	  technologies	  at	  a	  faster	  rate	  than	  
in	  the	  public	  sector.	  
1	   1	   -­‐2	   1	  
28.	  'Encapsulated'	  geoengineering	  technologies	  are	  ethically	  preferable	  to	  non-­‐
encapsulated	  technologies.	  
2	   -­‐1	   0	   1	  
29.	  In	  a	  geoengineered	  world,	  rather	  than	  finding	  deep	  meaning	  in	  our	  natural	  
surroundings,	  humanity	  might	  start	  to	  view	  them	  as	  a	  constant	  potential	  threat.	  
-­‐1	   -­‐3	   0	   -­‐2	  
30.	  Complex	  control	  systems	  never	  work	  perfectly,	  humans	  can	  make	  mistakes	  in	  
design,	  manufacturing,	  and	  operation	  (think	  of	  Chernobyl,	  the	  Exxon	  Valdez,	  
airplane	  crashes	  etc);	  given	  this	  fallibility,	  it	  is	  unwise	  to	  stake	  so	  much	  on	  a	  more	  
complicated	  arrangement	  than	  anything	  attempted	  before.	  
0	   -­‐2	   4	   3	  
31.	  There	  are	  such	  things	  as	  morally	  bad	  research	  projects.	   3	   0	   2	   3	  
32.	  We	  don't	  have	  the	  luxury	  of	  waiting	  around	  for	  a	  change	  in	  attitude	  that	  is	  never	  
going	  to	  happen,	  or	  until	  it	  is	  far	  too	  late	  for	  action.	  
1	   4	   -­‐2	   2	  
33.	  Government	  support	  for	  geoengineering	  research	  is	  important,	  because	  good	  
policy	  decisions	  depend	  on	  good	  science.	  
3	   2	   0	   2	  
34.	  A	  ban	  on	  geoengineering	  would	  be	  unenforceable	  and	  counter-­‐productive	  as	  
those	  carrying	  out	  tests	  would	  do	  so	  in	  secrecy.	  
0	   1	   -­‐3	   -­‐2	  
35.	  Geoengineering	  technologies	  will	  not	  "solve"	  the	  climate	  change	  "problem";	  
rather,	  they	  will	  redesign	  major	  Earth	  systems	  -­‐	  including	  not	  just	  natural	  but	  human	  
and	  built	  systems	  -­‐	  powerfully,	  unpredictably	  and	  potentially	  irreversibly.	  
0	   -­‐3	   3	   0	  
36.	  Substantial	  investment	  in	  geoengineering	  research	  will	  encourage	  political	  
inertia	  on	  mitigation	  and	  adaptation,	  and	  also	  facilitate	  the	  actual	  deployment	  of	  
geoengineering	  "solutions".	  	  
-­‐1	   -­‐2	   2	   -­‐1	  
37.	  In	  a	  nutshell:	  someone,	  somewhere	  is	  going	  to	  do	  geoengineering	  research,	  so	  it	  
might	  as	  well	  be	  someone	  responsible.	  
2	   0	   -­‐1	   -­‐2	  
38.	  Given	  that	  geoengineering	  experiments	  are	  already	  underway	  -­‐	  uncontrolled,	  
unmonitored,	  illegal	  -­‐	  then	  it	  is	  time	  for	  the	  world	  to	  have	  a	  serious	  conversation	  
about	  geoengineering.	  
2	   0	   2	   0	  
39.	  Even	  if	  we	  stopped	  emitting	  any	  greenhouse	  gases	  right	  now,	  we'd	  still	  have	   4	   0	   -­‐1	   0	  
	   	  
locked	  in	  at	  least	  1.5	  degrees	  of	  warming,	  probably	  more,	  and	  there's	  no	  sign	  that	  
we're	  going	  to	  stop	  emitting	  any	  time	  soon.	  	  So	  some	  kinds	  of	  geoengineering	  might	  
be	  a	  necessity,	  not	  as	  a	  solution,	  but	  as	  a	  postscript	  to	  a	  solution.	  
40.	  Although	  there	  is	  a	  lot	  of	  variety	  in	  the	  geoengineering	  approaches	  being	  
proposed,	  at	  the	  end	  of	  the	  day	  they	  are	  technological	  fixes	  -­‐	  and	  so	  flawed.	  
-­‐3	   -­‐3	   1	   -­‐4	  
41.	  It	  is	  likely	  that	  some	  new	  technologies	  will	  be	  needed	  to	  move	  to	  lower-­‐polluting	  
energy	  systems	  and	  to	  adapt	  to	  likely	  climatic	  changes;	  but	  the	  types	  of	  
technologies	  pursued,	  the	  interests	  they	  favour	  and	  the	  future	  societal	  vision	  they	  
serve	  (or	  suppress)	  ought	  to	  be	  the	  subject	  of	  public	  deliberation	  and	  ultimately	  
public	  control.	  	  
2	   -­‐1	   4	   4	  
42.	  The	  governance	  challenges	  of	  controlling	  the	  global	  climate	  through	  
geoengineering	  are	  more	  difficult	  to	  overcome	  than	  those	  of	  transforming	  the	  
global	  energy	  system.	  
1	   -­‐2	   1	   0	  
43.	  Since	  we	  know	  that	  accumulating	  carbon	  dioxide	  in	  the	  atmosphere	  is	  a	  problem	  
requiring	  action,	  then	  we	  need	  to	  focus	  our	  energies	  on	  finding	  ways	  of	  taking	  it	  out	  
and	  storing	  it	  somewhere	  safe	  and	  permanent,	  the	  same	  way	  we	  do	  with	  problems	  
like	  nuclear	  waste	  and	  arsenic	  in	  water	  supplies.	  
0	   3	   -­‐1	   4	  
44.	  The	  anti-­‐geoengineering	  people	  are	  ideologically	  motivated	  and	  rely	  on	  doom	  
and	  gloom	  stories	  about	  the	  environment;	  the	  last	  thing	  they	  want	  to	  see	  is	  that	  
some	  of	  these	  techniques	  might	  work.	  	  
-­‐1	   0	   -­‐4	   -­‐1	  
45.	  All	  of	  the	  technologies	  needed	  to	  meet	  global	  2020	  emissions	  reductions	  exist	  
today.	  
4	   0	   3	   -­‐3	  
46.	  It’s	  not	  a	  question	  of	  if	  but	  when	  humanity	  will	  be	  compelled	  to	  use	  
geoengineering.	  
-­‐1	   4	   -­‐4	   0	  
47.	  There	  is	  an	  important	  difference	  between	  geoengineering	  field	  experiments	  that	  
do	  not	  cause	  damage	  to	  the	  environment,	  and	  those	  that	  specifically	  aim	  to	  perturb	  
natural	  systems;	  so	  a	  blanket	  ban	  on	  field	  testing	  doesn't	  make	  sense.	  
2	   1	   -­‐1	   2	  
48.	  Right	  now,	  the	  Arctic	  (and	  hence	  the	  Earth)	  is	  in	  a	  state	  of	  dire	  emergency,	  and	  
only	  immediate	  drastic	  action,	  including	  some	  forms	  of	  geoengineering,	  can	  save	  us	  
from	  catastrophe.	  	  
-­‐2	   4	   -­‐3	   0	  
 
 
  
	   	  
Table 2.  Degree to which each participant’s sort correlated with each factor 
Participants	  (by	  professional	  sector)	   Degree	  of	  correlation	  of	  Q	  sorts	  with	  each	  factor	  
	   1	   2	   3	   4	  
Participants	  whose	  sorts	  correlate	  with	  just	  one	  factor:	  
Media	   0.7146*	   0.2620	   -­‐0.2620	   0.3663	  
Academia	  (physical/natural	  sciences)	   0.5894*	   0.2479	   -­‐0.2479	   0.1008	  
Academia	  (physical/natural	  sciences)	   0.6133*	   0.1971	   -­‐0.1971	   0.1116	  
Government	   0.8248*	   -­‐0.0039	   0.0039	   0.0494	  
Academia	  (physical/natural	  sciences)	   0.6957*	   0.0514	   -­‐0.0514	   0.2540	  
Academia	  (physical/natural	  sciences)	   0.5064*	   0.3414	   -­‐0.3414	   0.0585	  
NGO	   0.5218*	   -­‐0.2054	   0.2054	   0.3222	  
Academia	  (physical/natural	  sciences)W	   0.5637*	   -­‐0.2639	   0.2639	   0.0650	  
Academia	  (physical/natural	  sciences)	   0.6423*	   -­‐0.0186	   0.0186	   0.3463	  
Industry	   0.6968*	   0.2824	   -­‐0.2824	   0.2885	  
NGO	   0.3744	   0.6110*	   -­‐0.6110	   0.2209	  
NGO	   0.1652	   0.7993*	   -­‐0.7993	   0.2589	  
NGO	   -­‐0.1203	   -­‐0.7913	   0.7913*	   0.1451	  
Academia	  (social	  sciences/humanities)W	   -­‐0.3013	   -­‐0.7216	   0.7216*	   0.0222	  
MediaW	   -­‐0.1471	   -­‐0.7851	   0.7851*	   -­‐0.0880	  
Academia	  (social	  sciences/humanities)(CGG)	   0.2630	   -­‐0.6437	   0.6437*	   0.2930	  
Academia	  (social	  sciences/humanities)W	   -­‐0.0386	   -­‐0.8237	   0.8237*	   -­‐0.0222	  
Academia	  (physical/natural	  sciences)	   0.3661	   -­‐0.2500	   0.2500	   0.6441*	  
Industry	   0.1517	   0.0618	   -­‐0.0618	   0.5440*	  
IndustryW	   0.3012	   -­‐0.1675	   0.1675	   0.5893*	  
Academia	  (social	  sciences/humanities)	   -­‐0.2322	   0.1116	   -­‐0.1116	   0.7681*	  
Participants	  whose	  sorts	  correlated	  with	  more	  than	  one	  factor:	  
Government	   0.6669*	   0.4148*	   -­‐0.4148	   -­‐0.0534	  
NGO	   0.6418*	   0.0730	   -­‐0.0730	   0.4445*	  
IndustryW	   0.405*	   0.4904*	   -­‐0.4904	   0.4047*	  
Academia	  (physical/natural	  sciences)W	   0.4325*	   -­‐0.0165	   0.0165	   0.4227*	  
IndustryW	   0.4206*	   0.5229*	   -­‐0.5229	   0.4998*	  
Academia	  (social	  sciences/humanities)W	   0.4087*	   -­‐0.4449	   0.4449*	   0.1662	  
Academia	  (physical/natural	  sciences)W	   0.5006*	   -­‐0.3921	   0.3921*	   -­‐0.0582	  
Academia	  (physical/natural	  sciences)	   0.5248*	   0.2192	   -­‐0.2192	   0.5806*	  
Industry	   0.5671*	   0.5335*	   -­‐0.5335	   0.0511	  
Academia	  (social	  
sciences/humanities)W(CGG)	   0.5572*	   0.0330	   -­‐0.0330	   0.5167*	  
IndustryW	   0.6124*	   0.4552*	   -­‐0.4552	   0.3127	  
Academia	  (physical/natural	  sciences)(CGG)	   0.519*	   0.4099*	   -­‐0.4099	   0.3618	  
Academia	  (social	  sciences/humanities)(CGG)	   0.0775	   -­‐0.5757	   0.5757*	   0.5035*	  
Academia	  (social	  sciences/humanities)W(CGG)	   0.1935	   -­‐0.6088	   0.6088*	   0.5097*	  
* Indicates that a sort correlates significantly with the factor at the p < 0.01 level; (w) indicates 
that an individual carried out a web based Q sort using Q assessor; (CGG) indicates that an 
individual is associated with the Climate Geoengineering Governance research project, including 
the author. 
  
	   	  
Table 3. Correlations between factors. 
	   Factor	  1	   Factor	  2	   Factor	  3	   Factor	  4	  
Factor	  1	   1	   0.4015	   -­‐0.2080	   0.3588	  
Factor	  2	   	   1	   -­‐0.7225	   0.2007	  
Factor	  3	   	   	   1	   0.0726	  
Factor	  4	   	   	   	   1	  
 
 
Results 
Narrative descriptions of the four factors that emerged from analysis are given 
below. The factors were assigned names drawn from statements that were 
ranked particularly highly for that factor, and act as an abbreviated story line, 
capturing some essence of the larger narrative.  The numbers in square brackets 
within the text refer to the statement upon which the interpretation is based 
(see Table 1). It will be noted (in Table 2) that a number of individuals’ Q sorts 
correlated with more than one factor which suggests that ‘there is not 
necessarily radical discontinuity across discourses’ (Dryzek & Berejikian 1993), 
and that many individuals have access to, and may move between discourses or 
framings (c.f. Collins & Yearley 1992). The relatively high number of these 
individuals might also be illustrative of the fundamentally ambiguous nature of 
the term geoengineering, or perhaps suggestive of the fact that around and 
between the more stable framings described below, the discursive landscape is 
characterised by a high degree of ambivalence as people struggle to formulate 
opinions incorporating contradictory normative positions.  Although the framings 
will be described below as discrete in order to facilitate an exploration of some of 
the different tensions within and between them, it should be remembered that 
this is not actually the case 
Factor 1:  “At the very least we need more research”  
Ten participants’ sorts were correlated significantly with this factor, including six 
individuals from academic (natural/physical science) backgrounds, one 
journalist, one government employee, one non-governmental organisation 
professional, and an individual from an industrial background.  This framing has 
been summarised as follows: 
Action on climate change is clearly urgent [39], but arguments that frame the 
need for geoengineering in terms of an emergency are unhelpful and 
counterproductive [48].  Geoengineering is certainly not the most revolutionary 
new idea in climate policy [14], however we shouldn’t rule any options out, and 
at the very least we need more research in this area to understand what 
approaches won’t work and should be avoided at all costs [12]. Research is the 
only way to determine the potential impacts of different technologies, and we 
have now achieved the level of scientific sophistication to make research in this 
	   	  
area worthwhile [5, 17].  Research is clearly distinct from deployment, and if 
carried out in a responsible manner, should not be overly controversial [16]. 
Indeed, if responsible parties don’t carry out research, it will be done by less 
responsible parties [37].  Furthermore, the technical community has a 
responsibility to explore back-up strategies for dealing with possible future 
climate emergences [19].  Now is the time for a serious societal conversation 
about if and how we want to develop these different technologies [38], and 
public involvement in choices about directions of research and development in 
this area are crucial [13, 41]. Regulation of research is important, but should be 
undertaken carefully, as there is a risk that hastily developed regulation might 
be counter-productive and stifle innovation and scientific freedom [4]. Given the 
variety of different research activities that might take place a moratorium on all 
activities outside the laboratory doesn’t make sense [25, 47]. Although the 
deployment of geoengineering is by no means inevitable [46], and we already 
have all the technology we need to reduce emissions [45], some kinds of 
geoengineering will probably be a necessary part of any solution [39].  
Geoengineering technologies that are likely to be more ethically preferable are 
‘encapsulated technologies’ such as air capture, rather than non-encapsulated 
techniques such as stratospheric aerosols or iron fertilization [28].  Commercial 
involvement in geoengineering might be helpful [27], but we should probably be 
wary of claims of technologies to provide win-win solutions allowing economic 
growth and mitigation to proceed hand in hand [23]. 
Factor 2:  “We are the planetary maintenance engineers”  
Two participants’ sorts were correlated significantly with this factor, both of 
whom are associated with non-governmental organisations.  The framing has 
been summarised as follows: 
We are currently in an unprecedented planetary emergency brought about by 
climate change [4], immediate action is urgent [32], and it is likely to be only a 
question of time before humanity is compelled to use geoengineering [46].  
Geoengineering is an important part of the solution to climate change [35, 40], 
hence, research on geoengineering is both crucial and worthwhile [5, 17], and 
should be supported by governments as the best basis for sound policy making 
[33]. Humans have demonstrated their ability to build functioning complex 
control systems [30], and now need to apply that knowledge to the task of 
planetary maintenance engineering that (like it or not) now falls upon us [6]. 
Given the dire state of the climate, neither research nor deployment of 
geoengineering should be overly controversial [16]. Although there might be 
some risk associated with research, not carrying out research given what we 
know about climate change would be riskier [3].  Only through research can we 
learn what technologies might be helpful, and conversely which shouldn’t be 
deployed [12].  Investment in geoengineering research isn’t likely to have a 
significantly negative impact on policies towards mitigation and adaptation, 
especially when one considers the dire state that mitigation policies are in 
	   	  
already [36], and while the governance of geoengineering brings particular 
challenges, these are likely to be less difficult to overcome than the challenges of 
transforming the global energy system [42], which so far appears to have failed. 
Indeed geoengineering has the potential to revolutionise climate policy [14], 
opening-up possibilities for economic growth and climate change mitigation to 
proceed hand in hand [23].  We should not be too hasty in pursuing regulation, 
which might be stifling to innovation and research [4]. A ban on geoengineering 
would just be counterproductive [25], likely resulting in research being carried 
out in secrecy or by less responsible parties [34, 47].  Those carrying out 
research are motivated by a desire to find solutions to the climate change 
problem, and for developing ‘back-up’ strategies for dealing with a possible 
future climate emergency [19], rather than any other motivation [8, 7]. Given 
the urgency of the problem, commercial involvement in geoengineering might be 
positive in terms of mobilizing innovation and capital investment, possibly 
increasing the speed with which these technologies could be developed [27].  
Factor 3: “Geoengineering is a political strategy”  
Five participants’ sorts were significantly correlated with this factor, including 3 
individuals from academic (social science/ humanities) backgrounds, one 
journalist and one individual associated with a non-governmental organisation.  
This framing has been summarised as follows: 
Geoengineering won’t solve climate change, but is likely to cause unpredictable 
and irreversible damage to the planet [35]. Attempts to control the climate 
through geoengineering are neither feasible [30], nor inevitable [46], and would 
likely lead humanity to a dystopian future in which we would find ourselves 
trapped by the consequences of our hubristic actions [21]. Geoengineering 
proposals stem from the same mind set of attempting to control nature that got 
us into the environmental mess we are in today [1], and are built on the 
dangerous illusion that complex social problems can be solved with technology 
[9].  The idea that all of the proposed technologies can be defined as 
geoengineering because their stated intent is to deal with climate change, is 
misleading [22]. More than as a set of technologies defined by a stated shared 
intent, geoengineering can be thought of as a political strategy [24] that serves 
the interests of the status quo. The commercial interest in some of these 
technologies only serves to highlight this, and if we were really serious that 
geoengineering was about ‘saving the planet’ we wouldn’t leave such a task to 
business [27].  We have all the technologies we need to mitigate carbon 
emissions effectively; it’s just a question of using them [45]. More research into 
new technologies isn’t the most crucial thing [12], indeed, the risks of doing 
research (including the risk of strategic military applications of these 
technologies [8]) may well outweigh the benefits [3]. It isn’t possible to separate 
out research from deployment in any straightforward way, and both should be 
considered controversial [16]: carrying out research, especially field trials, is the 
first step toward deployment, and drawing distinctions between different types 
	   	  
of field test only serves to obscure this fact [47].  Since full-scale trials are 
unethical and small-scale trials can’t produce useful data in the noise of global 
weather [5], it is common sense to institute a moratorium on all testing 
activities outside the laboratory [25]. The argument that ‘someone somewhere 
will do it, so it might as well be us’ [37] is not acceptable, nor are arguments 
stemming from claims of present day [48] or hypothetical future emergencies 
[12]. The governance challenges of controlling the global climate through 
geoengineering would likely be more complex and difficult to overcome than 
those of transforming the global energy system [42], and given the 
undemocratic and risky nature of proposals for geoengineering, we probably 
shouldn’t be going down this path [21]. Publics need to be engaged meaningfully 
in decisions about research [13], and ultimately have control over which (if any) 
of these technologies are to be pursued [41]. However, much talk of governance 
seems to see deployment as inevitable, and is hence a purely instrumental 
exercise for smoothing this process, rather than allowing genuine dissent to 
emerge [26].   
Factor 4: “Let’s focus on carbon”  
Four participants’ sorts were significantly correlated with this factor, including 
two individuals from industrial backgrounds, and two individuals from academic 
backgrounds (one social scientist, one natural scientist).  The framing has been 
summarised as follows: 
Action on climate change is urgent [32], and is likely to require the development 
and deployment of new technologies [45], including some that might be labelled 
as geoengineering [39].  However, the definition of geoengineering is slippery 
and after realising that our actions en masse affect the climate, anything we do 
to address it (including nothing) might be considered geoengineering [18].  
Although ambiguous, the concept of geoengineering might be useful as a 
political strategy to help open up the solution space available to us for dealing 
with climate change [24].  There is nothing wrong with a technological fix per se 
[40, 20], but it’s important to remember that technology alone will not ‘solve’ 
the climate change problem [35]. It is important to ensure that the direction of 
development of these technologies is the subject of public deliberation and 
control [41], so that, appropriately managed, Geoengineering does not have to 
be fundamentally undemocratic [2]. We clearly need research into new 
technologies, if only to be able to rule out those that shouldn’t be deployed [12], 
but some research is more morally acceptable [31] than others, and the 
argument that ‘someone will do it so it might as well be someone responsible’ 
(i.e. us) is problematic [37].  Research cannot be neatly separated from 
deployment, and thus it is difficult to defend the idea that only deployment 
should be controversial [16]. For this reason publics should be engaged 
‘upstream’ in the direction of research in this area [13]. The inherent 
complexities of the climate system limit the human ability to predict and judge 
cause and effects of interventions [17].  This complexity, coupled with human 
	   	  
fallibility, means that attempts to control the climate system are likely to fail 
[30].  Hence we should focus our energies on removing carbon dioxide from the 
atmosphere [43] (an endeavour in which commercial involvement might be 
helpful [27]), so that with the right technological and social changes, a carbon 
neutral future for humanity can be achieved [11], and mitigation and continuing 
economic activity can take place [23].  
 
	    
	   	  
Discussion 
No claim is made that the four framings of geoengineering that have been 
described above, constitute any kind of comprehensive, authoritative or final set 
of framings.  As in any study of discourse (whether acknowledged or not), these 
might rather be thought of as stylised representations that will hopefully be of 
heuristic utility in offering ‘tools to think with’ in processes of further enquiry 
(c.f. Brand & J. Fischer 2012). This discussion will draw out some of the tensions 
between and within the different framings, starting with an examination of the 
fluidity and ambiguity of the term itself and the definitions of geoengineering 
given by participants, before examining how concepts of control, research, 
novelty and interests all feature within and constitute the different framings of 
geoengineering.  
Given the existence of campaigns both for8 and against9 geoengineering in 
general, one might expect to find opinion around geoengineering highly 
polarised. The emergence of a bipolar factor (split into factors 2 and 3), 
indicating highly opposed views, is therefore perhaps unsurprising. The 
prominence of this axis also confirms the general salience for this purpose of an 
aggregated concept of ‘geoengineering’. However, the existence of a further two 
factors clearly indicates that the picture is not as simple as a description of a 
straightforward ‘pro’ /‘anti’ axis might suggest. With regard to the coherence or 
ambiguity of the term geoengineering, it appears that (although the most 
different in terms of their framing of geoengineering) individuals loading on 
factor 2 (broadly in favour of geoengineering), and factor 3 (decidedly against 
geoengineering), actually appeared to find it less problematic making statements 
about geoengineering as a non-differentiated category, than those loading on 
factors 1 and 4.  Thus for example, within the factor-3 framing, a total ban on all 
geoengineering activities outside the laboratory is a necessary and coherent 
thing to call for [25].  Likewise within the factor-2 framing, geoengineering (in 
general) is one of the most revolutionary new ideas in climate policy [14]. 
Interview data collected at the time of the Q sorts can be instructive in 
understanding this.  Thus a participant whose sort correlated with factor 2 
explained why he considered the term geoengineering to be useful: 
‘The term has proven to be very useful because of the discussions it 
catalyses.  I view the real utility of geoengineering not really as being the 
technological interventions but as being so extreme as a concept that it 
actually provokes imagination and the ability to open up discussions that 
are otherwise mired in more detailed political positions…it opens up new 
opportunities for reframing how we deal with climate…’  
On the other hand the following quote from a participant whose sort correlated 
with factor 3 illustrates why he feels it is meaningful to object to geoengineering 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8	  E.g.	  AMEG	  (the	  Arctic	  Methane	  Emergency	  Group)	  www.amegme	  	  
9	  E.g.	  The	  HOME	  (Hand’s	  Off	  Mother	  Earth)	  campaign	  http://www.handsoffmotherearth.org/	  	  
	   	  
is possible, and disaggregating the term is not considered to be of primary 
importance: 
‘I just think there's a broader thing afoot about trying to solve problems 
through technological solutions rather than the heavy lifting of social 
change and actually addressing the root causes and so forth, and 
geoengineering in some way I think is totemic for that… it’s not just about 
a geoengineering solution, it kind of speaks to, we're going to have a 
technological solution for this, whether its carbon capture and storage or 
biofuels or air capture or nuclear power, whatever it is, we're going to 
craft a technological way round this, such that we don't have to 
significantly disrupt the economy…’ 
But while this participant appears to be able to object to geoengineering as 
illustrative of a broader (in his view) problematic attitude towards the application 
of technology to social and environmental problem solving, , participants loading 
on factor 1, appeared much less willing to take such a general or abstract stand.  
A fairly typical quote from a participant loading on factor 1 illustrates this: 
‘My reaction to the term is that it isn’t particularly helpful because it 
describes different groups of approaches. So there’s negative emissions, 
taking carbon out of the air, carbon dioxide removal I guess it’s called in 
the academic world, which is a very different set of interventions than the 
solar radiation management stuff.  So geoengineering is a catch-all term 
that creates challenges for us to then have a clear position on… and within 
those there’s lots of different approaches which each have their pros and 
cons and different risk profile. 
Another commented: 
‘I don't want to have a debate about the terminology too much, I think I 
want to have a debate more about what the technologies do to our 
climate and I don't think having huge arguments about what a term is or 
not really make much difference to that’. 
Interestingly, although the factor-1 perspective appears to find the ‘catch all’ 
nature of the term presents a problem for the making of general statements 
about geoengineering, and prefers to focus attention on individual technologies, 
this view is very clear about what geoengineering is not. Hence it appears from 
the negative score awarded to statement 18, that the definition of 
geoengineering (while encompassing a broad range of technologies) does not 
include those activities the effects of which were inadvertent.  
A different perspective still was offered by factor 4, whose agreement with 
statement 18, suggest a distinctive take on the issue of intent, and a broader 
understanding of what might constitute geoengineering.  For example, one 
factor-4 participant defined the term to include interventions not generally 
	   	  
classed as technological, such as the implementation of a carbon tax (See 
definition 7 in Table 4 below). While subscribing to a very broad definition of the 
term itself (to the extent that it might be difficult to differentiate from other 
categories of effort such as mitigation), factor-4 participants were also conscious 
of the possible utility of the term itself as offering something distinctive on the 
discursive level at least.  Hence one participant argued against the so-called 
‘moral hazard’ argument against geoengineering research [36], by referred to 
the fact that arguments against geoengineering such as this act to prematurely 
close down ‘the solution space, the option space that you want to keep open.’ 
Understanding ‘the strategically and politically loaded negotiation of definition 
and meaning’ (Walker & Shrove 2007, p.216) is crucial to understanding 
framing, and definitions themselves can be understood as key elements of wider 
frames. Table 4. lists a selection of definitions of geoengineering given by 
participants.10  
Table 4. Selection of participants’ definitions of geoengineering 
Definitions of geoengineering (factor number(s) with which participant’s 
sort correlated). 
1. ‘Deliberate large scale interventions in the earth’s natural systems’ (1/4) 
2. ‘I suppose I’ve been influenced quite a bit by the Royal Society report and its very 
inclusive definition of geoengineering to include any deliberate attempt to change the 
climate, to fix the climate… Any deliberate attempt to fix the climate apart from cutting our 
actual emissions’. (1) 
3. ‘To me it means intentional technical interference with atmospherics in order to mitigate 
some or all of the impacts of anthropogenic climate change…my framing would always be 
to have something to do with the impacts of climate change …I guess I can’t see why 
[weather modification for other purposes] wouldn’t be included…but all the discussions I’ve 
had have been with the climate change community and it has been a climate change 
framed discussion’(1) 
4. ‘I guess the scientific definition would be: the modification of climate variables to offset 
rising greenhouse gas concentrations and associated rise in temperature’(1) 
5. ‘Large scale, intentional attempts to change the climate system and other large scale 
systems’ (3) 
6. ‘All sorts of technological ways to combat climate change, so I’d be including removing 
green house gases, so particularly things like carbon scrubbing that takes out carbon 
dioxide and buries it underground, and also what they call solar radiation management, 
actually reflecting the sun.  To me it’s all those things’ (2) 
7. ‘Geoengineering is the intentional intervention in the global planetary system to affect 
weather and climate… I am agnostic on what those interventions are, I don’t differentiate 
geoengineering by methodology, so if you capture carbon from smokestacks in coal plants, 
or you implement a carbon tax, or you put particulates in the stratosphere, those are all 
examples of geoengineering…. (4) 
8. ‘What it conjures up to me really is talking about the global climate change, and thinking 
of technological solutions that can either dramatically speed up the rate of mitigation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10	  Not	  all	  participants	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  example	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  not	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  to	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climate change or do something different, that is prevent some of the worst effects of 
climate change’ (1) 
9. ‘It’s about humans taking interventions to try and control the climate system, which we’ve 
never deliberately done before even if we are now changing the climate system through 
our pollution, so it crosses a particular barrier…’ (1/4) 
10. ‘I just stick to the Royal Society definition really: deliberate, large scale manipulation of 
planetary environment in order to counteract anthropogenic climate change’ (3) 
11. [Climate remediation] ‘is trying to have available one or more, preferably a set of 
technologies such that if the planet gets into a really rather unfortunate situation with 
respect to the people living on it and the environment more generally you don’t have to 
live with the situation for hundreds and hundreds of years even if you shut down 
greenhouse gas emissions’ (1/2) 
12. ‘When I say geoengineering I mean something like solar radiation management.  
Geoengineering via carbon dioxide removal is a lot more blurred between geoengineering 
and mitigation, because is planting the Amazon rainforest and re-growing lots of trees 
mitigation? Or is it geoengineering because we're going to be locking up a lot of carbon in 
those trees? That is a very blurry line’ (1) 
 
An examination of the definitions reveals potentially significant ‘grey areas’ and 
ambiguities in the term. For example: is geoengineering defined as being solely 
about interventions in the climate system (e.g. 2, 3, 4), or could the definition 
also include any large-scale natural system (e.g. 1, 5)?  Is geoengineering 
defined as being about purely ‘technical’ or ‘technological’ interventions (e.g. 3, 
6), or could it also encompass economic or social changes (e.g. 7)?  At what 
scale does an intervention become geoengineering? Is weather modification 
included (e.g. 7), or is it only about global change (e.g. 3, 8 10)? Is the attempt 
to counteract climate change fundamental to the definition of geoengineering 
(e.g. 3, 4, 6, 10), or could an intervention be defined as geoengineering if 
carried out with other intent (e.g. 1, 5)? Is it primarily about control (e.g. 9)? 
Should it actually be called something else, such as climate remediation (e.g. 
11)? Or should the definition be narrowed down to just solar radiation 
management and exclude carbon dioxide removal (e.g. 12)?  
While the term’s ambiguity is therefore clear, it might be said to have ‘functional 
malleability’ (Gledhill, 1994 p 216).  Hence there appears to be a sense 
(particularly expressed by factor-2 participants) that the term in all its ambiguity 
might be politically useful in terms of acting as a catalyst for certain kinds of 
discussions.  Ironically the primary discourse of opposition as represented by 
factor 3, in its view of geoengineering as emblematic of the fundamentally 
flawed nature of the global neo-liberal political economy, might actually act to 
breathe life into it.  Within the factor-1 framing, the desire to disaggregate the 
term might be read as an opposition to the constraints of the term, or as an 
example of boundary work aimed at reducing ambiguity; while the broad 
definition of geoengineering offered by factor-4 participants could be read as a 
different type of boundary work actually aimed at increasing the ambiguity of 
the term.   
	   	  
Scholte et al (2012) argue that ‘ambivalence’ about geoengineering is a frame in 
and of itself (characterised by the presentation of arguments for and against 
geoengineering within one text), and they suggest that the increasing 
prevalence of ‘the ambivalence frame’ above other framings of geoengineering 
articles in newspapers, provides hope for increasing reflexivity in the debate.  
We concur that ambivalence is a characteristic of the discourse as a whole, as 
indicated by the co-existence of multiple divergent normative positions within 
the debate.  However, counter to the argument made by Scholte et al, 
ambivalence is not here understood as a singular way of framing geoengineering  
in and of itself.  The relatively high number of so-called ‘confounders’ 
(individuals whose Q sorts correlated with more than one frame), that emerged 
from the analysis presented here, could be interpreted as revealing  different 
forms of ambivalence with respect to these framings.  However, ambivalence 
with respect to the framings described here need not correspond to an individual 
being ambivalent about geoengineering per se, although equally, this may be 
the case in some instances. The existence of these ambivalences might best be 
interpreted as a degree of instability in the discourse, suggesting that the 
meanings attributed to geoengineering are still in some senses quite negotiable.  
Within the four frames uncovered by this study, there emerges clear (non-
ambivalent) support for, and opposition to geoengineering represented by the 
polarised factors 2 and 3.  In addition, the positions represented by factors 1 
and 4, rather than being distinguished by ambivalence, may actually be 
interpreted instead as clear efforts to formulate non-ambivalent positions with 
respect to different issues within the geoengineering discourse. For example, this 
may be by discriminating in more detail between particular technologies (to 
allow non-ambivalence on each). Or it may be through seeking to elucidate a 
discriminating normative position in relation to specific issues such as the 
controllability/knowability of the climate, the neutrality or otherwise of research, 
and the role of technology in society, each of which also has the effect of 
reducing ambivalence in particular instances. 
The existence of the framing exemplified by factor 4, also problematises the 
frequent calls for increasing precision around the term geoengineering as a pre-
requisite for effective governance discussion. This is because it highlights how no 
one framework for partitioning of the term geoengineering into sub-categories 
can in itself be thought of as final. The commonly used CDR/SRM distinction, for 
instance, or even to the level of ‘individual’ technologies, only makes sense from 
within particular frames.  Alternative partitionings of the overarching field, like 
those defined under factor 4, may cross-cut such a taxonomy – and each other. 
So any one form of precision may reduce particular ambiguities, but leave others 
unaddressed – or even compound them. Calls for greater precision must 
therefore be interrogated as to particular axes of precision involved and their 
implications. And it cannot be assumed that precision in and of itself will remedy 
ambiguity.  
Axes of difference 
	   	  
Hulme (2008) argues that the prospective routes held out to us for dealing with 
climate change all have ‘connotations of global control and mastery of the 
climatic future’ (p. 12), and this observation is borne out of the factors that 
emerged from this study, in which various ideas around the issue of control 
constitute one of the axes of difference between the framings.  Unsurprisingly 
perhaps, the starkest contrast is between the polarised views of factor 2 and 3, 
although interestingly notions of control are arguably central to both, with the 
former affirming the notion that ‘we can and should control the climate’, and the 
latter affirming the notion that ‘we can and should control the research.’ Hence 
the factor-2 framing of geoengineering as ‘planetary maintenance engineering’ 
[6], and its emphasis on the human ability to create complex control systems 
[30], building on an ever increasing scientific sophistication allowing greater 
understanding of complexity [17].  Conversely the factor-3 framing emphasizes 
what is perceived to be the folly of attempts to control nature [1, 15], the 
irreducible complexity and chaos of the climate system [17], and human 
fallibility in attempting to create complex control systems in the past [30].  The 
roles are reversed when the focus becomes control of research and other 
geoengineering activities, with the factor-2 framing emphasizing what is felt to 
be the ‘counterproductive’ nature of attempts to ban on geoengineering which 
would result in testing carried out in secrecy [34], and the inappropriateness of 
a moratorium on geoengineering [25], while the factor-3 framing emphasizes 
the perceived necessity of strong controls on research.  With regard to the 
degree to which this control of research is believed to be possible, one 
participant commented: 
‘It may be true that it’s not fully enforceable but it has very powerful norm 
setting… it’s very important to set that as the standard.’ 
While rejecting the ‘planetary maintenance’ metaphor, the factor-1 and 4 
framings diverge somewhat in their view of the feasibility of achieving climate 
control, with more reticence being expressed within the factor-4 framing, about 
the possibilities for either knowledge of complexity [17], and control of the 
climate [30]. 
The concept of research represents another fault line or tension between the 
framings.  Given that much discussion of geoengineering occurs in academic 
journals, and much of the discussion is about research of various types and 
disciplines, Geoengineering is thus framed by many as being ‘at the research 
stage’, and in particular factor 1 participants appeared to adhere to this view.  
Thus for example, a fairly typical factor-1 viewpoint was expressed thus: 
‘I would be paranoid and scared of anybody saying we're going to start 
geoengineering tomorrow, but I'd be just as worried about someone 
saying we're going to outlaw any research on geoengineering.  We need 
to do this research. Whether or not we actually do anything with the 
research is another matter. But in case we need to geoengineer, we 
	   	  
should do the research now. Because when you're doing it in a panic and 
you think you've only got 20 years before London is underwater, you're 
not going to do science as well as when you think we might not need to 
do this, you can actually sit back and concentrate and take a slightly 
longer term view of it’.   
 
The emphasis on research is broadly shared by factors 1, 2 and 4, as illustrated 
by factor scores for statements 3, 12, and 33, but is problematized by factor 3 in 
particular, and to a lesser extent factor 4 (statements 16 and 37).  Thus a factor 
3 participant commented about research: 
‘[research] creates a dynamic where you're moving towards something, it 
creates the beginnings of almost an industry of people who have invested 
in all of that.’  
 
And the same participant was keen to unpick the term, asking ‘what’s hidden in 
the term research’? and commenting: 
‘I think it’s a very deliberate, the term [research] gets kept together, and 
by being kept together it means that people who actually don't ever want 
to move to some kind of experimentation should nonetheless feel they 
have to support that statement [3] … it speaks to scientific freedom and 
all these kind of things, which of course and if you’re in academia are 
deeply important and rightly so, but I think it’s a deliberate strategy to 
keep that language obscure’. 
 
The way in which geoengineering is framed (particularly but not exclusively by 
factor 1 participants) as being at the research stage, also feeds into ideas about 
the degree to which geoengineering represents something fundamentally new 
and untried, or is a continuation/the latest manifestation of practices and ideas 
with a long history.  Of the four framings uncovered by this study, the emphasis 
on continuity is most apparent within the factor-3 and 4 framings, while as 
outlined above, 1 and 2 appear to emphasize research and novelty.  For 
example, factor 3 was distinctive among the four factors in awarding neither a 
positive nor negative ranking to statement 7 (that deliberate geoengineering has 
been happening for decades and was not all about dealing with climate change).  
Interview data and comments from participants who loaded on factor 3 point to 
a division over exactly what this means.  One view was characterised by the 
following comments: 
‘Geoengineering technologies patented decades ago have been and are 
being used covertly as political/economic/military weapons. This is 
obvious to anyone who studies the sky and knows the history of 
weather/climate modification development. Look up!’ 
 
	   	  
Although not all factor-3 participants shared this view, the issue of continuity 
with other technologies and the idea that the issue was broader than the current 
climate change focus might suggest were shared.  Hence another factor 3 
participant commented: 
‘I do think there’s other interests in geoengineering other than climate 
change, particularly commercial interests. I think there’s an attempt to 
create new markets in the longer term, there is military interest… I don’t 
think they’ve been spraying but I do think it’s not all about climate 
change. There’s more reasons to want to have geoengineering as a tool in 
the box than climate change’. 
 
The distinction between geoengineering, weather modification and so-called 
‘chemtrails’ theories is worthy of a brief note at this point.  As a subject 
discussed and debated by governments, think-tanks and academics, 
geoengineering in all its ambiguity appears to have acquired widespread 
credibility as a ‘serious’ (Keith & Dowlatabadi 1992) scientific subject.  Weather 
modification on the other hand, has a relatively less authoritative status, 
occasionally presented as a ‘pseudo-science’, associated with an array of more 
or less credible characters driven by a variety of more or less honourable 
intentions (Fleming 2006).  While finally the ‘chemtrail’ theory (positing the 
existence of a global network of weather modification for nefarious ends), lacks 
credibility and authority and is widely labelled (dismissively) as a conspiracy 
theory. However, as this examination of the multiple framings of geoengineering 
has revealed, the boundaries around terms and activities are by no means clear 
cut or un-ambiguous, and on-going boundary work (c.f. Gieryn 1983) is required 
to maintain the distinction between terms in such a way as to maintain the 
epistemic authority of certain actors.   
 
Interview comments from factor-4 participants reveal a view that is more explicit 
about the fluid and blurred nature of the boundaries between different activities: 
‘We’re already geoengineering the climate … I mean we do a lot to try and 
change the climate system, we dam rivers, we irrigate large parts of 
farmland that changes the local climate, we deforest.  In the western US I 
think there’s 169 weather modification project that try to improve rainfall, 
China does it systematically…’ 
 
And when questioned further about the distinctiveness of weather modification 
from geoengineering, the same participant highlighted the continuum between 
them and the constructed character of notions of ‘climate’, by commenting:  
‘Weather is events and climate is statistics…’ 
 
The distinction between weather modification and geoengineering is also brought 
into question by the following comment made by a factor-1 participant: 
	   	  
 
‘[The Chinese] are raising from 70 million to 500 million a year the 
amount they’re spending on their weather modification program, and once 
you get to half a billion dollars a year, you’re actually talking about 
something that on aggregate could have a significant effect.. Assume it’s 
effective , you’re now at a stage where you’re modifying local weather 
sufficiently over a long enough period that it’s kind of like a 
geoengineering intervention […] I think we’re going to back-step into 
geoengineering in that way.’ 
 
The emphasis on novelty or continuity in different framings of geoengineering is 
intimately connected to different framings of the interests and motivations at 
play, and this is another axis of difference along which the framings uncovered 
by this study can be seen to diverge.   Again, factors 3 and 4 are united by a 
shared framing of the potential for non-climate change related application of 
geoengineering technologies, including military applications. 
But beyond more radical uses of geoengineering technologies for purposes other 
than combating climate change, a key distinguishing characteristic of the factor-
3 perspective is that geoengineering – both the technologies it comprises and 
the attitude it is understood to represent – is an explicitly political project.  The 
framing of the issue is understood to be a key component of that project.  As a 
participant explained: 
‘On the pro-geoengineering side I think there is a small core of 
ideologically motivated and politically smart and active people who are 
moving people intentionally, particularly in the whole framing game in 
very careful ways … while there is a lot of naivety and good intention 
throughout the discussion there’s also some very active interests…  I can 
see some evidence of that. That sounds conspiratorial, it’s not … it’s just 
looking at the political economy of discussions around climate change’. 
Finally, various authors have noted the use of a real or hypothetical climate 
emergency as a powerful framing device within which geoengineering 
interventions are situated, and similarly the existence of  a climate emergency 
was an important element of one of the framings (factor 2) that emerged from 
this study.  The following comment typifies this element of the framing: 
‘The risks from the climate are infinitely worse than the risks from 
geoengineering, I mean that’s absolutely obvious.  I say infinitely because 
that means the end of everything, end of civilisation possibly all human 
life, I mean it’s as serious as that […] Long term it’s a catastrophe. 
However, although interviews reveal that the urgency of the climate predicament 
is clearly important for many people, it appears that the framing of the issue in 
terms of emergency is being consciously rejected by all but factor-2 participants 
[statement 48]. For example, one factor-1 participant commented:  ‘I think the 
	   	  
whole idea of a climate emergency is really kind of counter-productive.’ Another 
hinted at a more strategic view of framing by commenting that it was not a 
question of whether emergency was a reality or not, but whether or not the 
emergency frame was helpful for achieving particular ends: 
‘I think people are consciously stepping away from [the emergency 
framing] because it’s become clear that different ideas about what 
emergency means makes the term useless… It’s difficult to use 
emergency to promote particular actions.’ 
However, although emergency was rejected as a valid framing of the issue by 
participants that loaded on factors 1 and 4, the idea of a hypothetical future 
emergency still featured within these views as a rationale for research 
[statement 19]. Participants loading on factor 3 rejected any emergency 
rationale (either present or future) for geoengineering.  One  participant 
explained why he considered the climate emergency framing to be problematic: 
 ‘The dangerous things to do with geoengineering, is to frame it … only to 
be a climate discussion, because if you do then it becomes this uni-
dimensional, you know, climate change has got terribly bad, we need to 
have a fix for it, everything gets arbitrated within this very narrow climate 
thing, but what your changing is the planet, or you know, large parts of it, 
which are much more than about climate, climate is just one factor.’ 
Significant silences 
It is worth noting that a number of people involved with critical environmental 
NGO’s, who were invited to take part in this study did not respond to invitations 
to participate, and hence it is likely that there may be a number of significant 
silences or gaps in the research presented.  The reasons for individuals’ 
reticence about involvement (whether about the subject matter, this particular 
study, or the Geoengineering Governance Project more broadly) were not 
specified and thus can only be the subject of conjecture.  However, Walker and 
Shrove point out that involvement of a broad range of stakeholders in 
participatory projects and processes, can raise a number of issues, with the 
potential for inclusion to be ‘re-interpreted as a process of co-option and 
neutering of dissent, producing deeply problematic tensions for those taking 
part’ (Walker & Shrove 2007, p.221). Indeed the issue of co-option was one that 
was raised explicitly by a factor 3 participant, who argued that much of the 
discussion around geoengineering was being manipulated by people interested in 
slowing down and confusing governance of climate change; and that hence even 
being drawn into these discussions would be to play into the hands of these 
interests.  He commented: 
‘There's a lot of well-intentioned people, who are caught up in the 
discussion and I think to some extent are being used, and some of them 
are letting themselves be used...’ 
	   	  
If then, one views the conversation itself as a massive distraction from existing 
governance discussions around climate change, then perhaps silence and non-
participation in that conversation, as embodied by refusals to participate in just 
such processes and projects as this one, can be read as an effective form of 
dissent (c.f. J. Whelan & Lyons 2005). 
 
Conclusion 
Fischer and Hajer (1999, p.2) argued that although conceptually weak, the term 
‘sustainable development’ created a generative metaphor or story-line around 
which different interests could converge, and thus proved to be a very functional 
concept.  Arguably the same might be said of the term ‘geoengineering’ (on a 
smaller, subordinate and more idiosyncratic canvas). As this study has 
illustrated, geoengineering has a fluid and ambiguous set of meanings and is 
framed by different actors in a number of ways. Interestingly (and unlike 
‘sustainability’), the convening power of the term seems equally potent in two 
opposing directions. This evident polarity within the debate as revealed by the 
existence of factors 2 and 3, appears to indicate a ‘framing gulf’ across which 
actors are likely to ‘talk past one another’ rather than engage meaningfully (c.f. 
Hoffman 2011).   
However, it is also the case that the existence of additional framings not defined 
purely along this axis of difference suggests an emerging resistance among 
certain actors to the debate becoming polarised in this way.  These alternative 
framings appear to be seeking either to increase (in the case of factor 4) or 
decrease (in the case of factor 1) the ambiguity of the term, but given the 
multiple framings and meanings within the term, the latter is unlikely ever to be 
fully realizable.  Unlike the picture suggested by Scholte et al. (2013), who 
suggest that what they call ‘the ambivalence frame may prove to be less 
powerful than other frames that evoke strong positive or negative feelings’, our 
findings suggest that ambivalence is not best seen as a frame in and of itself 
able to garner or lose support. Rather, along with ambiguity, it is a more 
pervasive and fundamental feature of the discursive landscape of 
geoengineering. 
Interviews have highlighted the diversity of actors broadly ascribing to shared 
framings of geoengineering, which might suggest the coming into existence of 
various discourse coalitions (F. Fischer & Forester 1993) around the term, linking 
otherwise disparate actors and networks through certain shared narratives and 
the utilisation of certain discursive resources (e.g. the narrative of the neutrality/ 
normative desirability of ‘research’ linking disparate groups within factor 1, or 
the narrative of the essentially undemocratic nature of engineering at the 
planetary scale, linking groups within factor 3).  And that the ambiguous nature 
and interpretative flexibility of the term facilitates this process by allowing 
individuals with perhaps little in common, to speak the same language or 
	   	  
advance shared interests.  Clearly there is also a danger here of co-option of 
certain actors by others utilizing particular framing devices strategically to 
garner support for a particular view.    
Finally there may be significant silences in the picture presented, and evidence 
of a desire for non-engagement in debates around geoengineering, which might 
have implications for future work on public engagement. 
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